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Abstract 
Solidarity is supposed to facilitate collective action. We argue that it can also help overcome 
false consciousness. Groups practice “epistemic solidarity” if they pool information about 
what is in their true interest and how to vote accordingly. The more numerous “Masses” can 
in this way overcome the “Elites,” but only if they are minimally confident with whom they 
share the same interests and only if they are (perhaps only just) better-than-random in voting 
for the alternative that promotes their interests. Being more cohesive and more competent 
than the Masses, the “Elites” can employ the same strategy perhaps all the more effectively.  
But so long as the “Masses” practice “epistemic solidarity” they will almost always win, 
whether or not the “Elites” do. By enriching the traditional framework of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem with group-specific standards of correctness, we investigate how groups can 
organize to support the alternatives truly in their interests. 
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Epistemic Solidarity as a Political Strategy 
 
How can the Masses overcome the power of Elites?  By organizing, of course.  
We have known for ages, and it is true in ever so many ways.  The purpose of 
this paper is to draw attention to yet another, perhaps more surprising 
respect in which that is also true:  organizing can be a way of overcoming a 
certain sort of false consciousness itself. 
Traditional organizing aims at producing concerted action.  In the 
present application, the aim of organizing is to produce correct beliefs – 
specifically, correct beliefs about our true interests.  Traditionally, false 
perceptions of our interests are seen as an impediment to collective action.  In 
the present context, awareness that our perceptions of our interests may be 
false serves as an impetus for us to collectivize – specifically, to pool our 
information.   
Elites are advantaged in ever so many ways.  In addition to having more 
power and wealth, they also have more information – most especially, 
information about what is in their interests and how to promote them.  By 
organizing, the Masses can overcome those advantages.  They do so by 
pooling, not only their power and wealth (in all the traditional ways), but also 
(the novel suggestion of this paper) their information about what is in their 
interests and how to promote them.   
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We dub this strategy of pooling information with selected others 
‘epistemic solidarity’.  The strategy works only within limits.  First, people 
have to be relatively confident with whom they share the same interests, even 
if they are unsure exactly what those interests are.  Second, the people in the 
group thus identified have to be more likely to be right than random 
regarding the content of those interests.1 Third, the less competent Masses 
must be more numerous than the more competent Elites. How much is 
required in each dimension is a function of how much is present in both of 
the other dimensions. 
What makes the trick of epistemic solidarity work is a phenomenon 
familiar from discussions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT).  That 
theorem says, roughly, that a majority among a group of voters, each of 
whom is more likely to be right than random, is more likely to be correct than 
is the individual voter; and the larger the number of voters, the more likely is 
a correct majority vote (that probability approaching certainty as the number 
of voters approaches infinity). 
Here is one way of stating the theorem more precisely.2 Assume a 
decision between two alternatives and a majority decision (without 
abstentions) in a population of odd size N. Let the state (of the world) be the 
fact which of the two alternatives is objectively correct. Two core assumptions 
are necessary for Condorcet’s jury theorem to hold: 
                                                 
1 Both of which are to say:  false consciousness must not run too deep. 
2 Cf. Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983; List and Goodin 2001. 
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Competence. All voters have the same probability 1>p> ½ to vote 
for the correct alternative (and this is true for both states). 
 
Independence. The votes are independent, conditional on the 
state.  
 
The theorem can then be stated as follows: 
 
Condorcet Jury Theorem. Given Competence and Independence, 
the probability of a correct majority decision increases in (odd) group 
size and approaches 1 as N goes to infinity.  
 
The present application alters that traditional framework by 
respecifying what voters are right about, that is, the state.  In the classic 
framework, the state is taken to be some truth about the world that is the 
same for everyone (how many jellybeans there are in the jar, or whether 
kissing transmits HIV, or what is in ‘the common good’ for us all).  In the 
current application, we abjure notions of ‘the common good’ and focus 
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instead upon group-specific criteria of ‘what is good for us’, which differs from 
one group to another. This means that the state is now group-specific.3   
Still, the same CJT logic applies – only for each group separately.  
Provided that the standard CJT conditions hold, a majority vote among 
members of each group is more likely to be correct than is an individual 
member about what is in her and her group’s interest.  Furthermore, that 
effect will be stronger the larger the group – which is of course precisely the 
advantage that the Masses enjoy over the Elites in availing themselves of this 
strategy. 
The upshot of this paper will be that the Masses can pretty well count on 
winning, just so long as they practice epistemic solidarity and they have 
sufficiently independent and competent opinions to pool.  There are some 
settings in which that will not be true, despite independence and 
competence.4  But these settings are sufficiently extreme to be of little 
practical consequence.   
Epistemic solidarity is a game that two can play, however.  
Furthermore, the Elites might well be better at playing it than the Masses.  If 
the Elites succeed in practicing epistemic solidarity and the Masses do not5 
then smaller and individually more competent Elites can sometimes prevail 
                                                 
3 The idea of a group-specific truth goes back to Alvin Goldman (1999, ch. 10). For a theorem 
in that regard, see ***.  
4 Where Elites are almost as big as Masses, for example, and/or are vastly more competent 
than them (while Mass competence is just over random). 
5 Or do so only very badly.  For how bad the Masses have to be at pooling, see Sec. IV.A 
below. 
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over Masses who are more numerous but individually less competent.  While 
that outcome will not always occur, it will in some scenarios that are 
sufficiently credible to be a real cause for concern. 
 
 
I.  The Effects of Sheer Numbers Alone 
 
To some extent, the Masses can win through sheer force of numbers alone, 
even without practicing epistemic solidarity.  They can afford more of their 
own to vote incorrectly, precisely because they have numbers to spare.  Let us 
start by investigating the chances of the Masses winning in that baseline case, 
without any epistemic solidarity. 
Suppose there are two groups in society, the Elites and the Masses.  
Suppose that the policy that is truly in the interests of each member of the 
Elites is E and of each member of the Masses is M, and those are the only two 
options.  Suppose that there are E Elite voters, each of whom is pe likely to 
vote correctly from his point of view (i.e., for E); and suppose that there are M 
Mass voters, each of whom is pm likely to vote correctly from his point of view 
(i.e., for M). The total size of the population is N = E + M.   
Imagine now a direct referendum in which each voter votes sincerely 
and independently of one another (conditional on the correct answer for their 
group).  And suppose that the electorate, as well as both subgroups E and M, 
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are large, so that the ‘law of large numbers’ applies.  Then, as the population 
size goes to infinity while keeping the ratio E:M fixed,  the proportion of 
votes for E in the total population would approach the population proportion 
of Elite voters who vote correctly from their point of view (which is 
approximately peE /N) plus the proportion of Mass voters who vote 
incorrectly from their point of view (which is approximately (1- pm)M/N).  
The proportion of votes for M in the population would be the population 
proportion of Mass voters who vote correctly from their point of view (which 
approximately equals pmM/N), plus the proportion of Elite voters who vote 
incorrectly from their point of view (which approximates to (1- pe)E/N).  The 
Mass position M is expected to defeat the Elite position E, therefore, if and 
only if  
pmM/N + (1-pe)E/ N) > peE/ N + (1- pm)M/ N   Eq. 1 
 or 
 pm > (E/M)(pe - ½) + ½       Eq. 2 
  
 The upshot of Equation 2 is that, even if they are less competent 
(defined as mistaking their own true interests more often), the Masses can 
nonetheless prevail over more competent Elites by virtue of their greater 
numbers.  Suppose, for example, the Elites are one-fifth as numerous as the 
Masses in a large population, and suppose that each member of the Elites is 
on average pe=0.70 likely to vote in his own true interests.  The position in the 
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true interest of the Masses, M, is more likely than not to win just so long as 
each member of the Masses is pm>0.54 likely to vote for that position himself. 
From Equation 2 we know what happens in the limiting case, where the 
number of voters approaches infinity.  While we are certainly very interested 
in what happens in very large group settings like that, we are also interested 
in what happens in the context of smaller (e.g., factory-sized6) groups.  So 
next let us estimate that. 
Table 1 tells us how likely majorities for M are for given group sizes and 
different levels of Elite and Mass competence. (Cells in which the inequality 
from equation 2 holds are marked in the table with an asterisk.)  Table 1 
confirms that what is true for large numbers also tends to be true for smaller 
numbers: the position in the interest of the Masses is more likely to prevail 
where the Masses are substantially more numerous or not much less 
competent than Elites – but not otherwise.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Take the case from Table 1 that is the most analogous to the one just 
discussed, where the Elite has size E=21 and competence pe=0.7 and the Mass 
has size M=100.  From Table 1 we see that M (the position in the true interest 
                                                 
6 Assume the factory is a cooperative, so decisions are made by a vote among all the members 
working in that factory.  But assume some members work in the management and 
others work on the shop floor, and each of those groups have differing interests. 
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of the Masses) is 56% likely to win if the Mass competence is pm=0.55, but it is 
only 28% likely to win if pm=0.51.  Despite members of the Masses still being 
individually more likely to be right than wrong, they are not so by a 
sufficiently wide margin in that latter case for the Masses to prevail by sheer 
weight of numbers alone. 
In short:  Despite their lower individual competence, the Masses can 
sometimes win by force of the sheer weight of numbers alone, without any 
coordination whatsoever.  But that happens only within strict limits. 
Overcoming those limits is where the strategy of epistemic solidarity comes 
into play. 
 
 
II.  Introducing Epistemic Solidarity 
 
 A.  Masses against Elites 
 
Suppose that all members of the Masses can recognize one another perfectly.  
Suppose that all members of the Masses make a pact, to which they all adhere 
perfectly, to vote the same way in the election.  Suppose that they determine 
which way that will be by a majority vote in a pre-election ballot among the 
Masses.  In that pre-election ballot, every member of the Masses votes 
sincerely and independently of every other, just as before. But come the 
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subsequent election itself, all members of the Masses vote, by that 
institutional arrangement, as a completely unified bloc. That is how we 
envisage the strategy of ‘epistemic solidarity’ working, in practice. 
Ex hypothesi, each member of the Masses votes in the pre-election ballot 
independently of each other.  Ex hypothesi, members of the Masses are more 
likely than random to be correct about where the interests of the Masses 
(which is the same for every member of the Masses) truly lie.  Ex hypothesi, 
there are a great many members of the Masses.  So the conditions of the CJT 
will obtain, and we can be broadly confident that the majority vote in the pre-
election ballot among the Masses indicates where the true interests of the 
Masses lie, just so long as Mass voters vote sincerely in line with their private 
signals in that ballot.   
The literature on strategic voting tells us that sincere voting is not 
necessarily (or even typically) a Nash equilibrium.  Then again, universal 
strategic voting is often not a Nash equilibrium either.7  Typically the Nash 
equilibria that do exist are not easily understood or anticipated, and hence 
not very likely to emerge among boundedly rational actors who have limited 
time, attention, information and cognitive capacities.    
But even if strategic Nash equilibria are practically unlikely to emerge, 
one may wonder whether it is plausible that out-of-equilibrium sincere voting 
                                                 
7 In the classic Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) set-up, 
if everyone votes strategically then nothing can be learned from the assumption 
that one’s vote is pivotal – in the worst case, no one takes into account any private 
information. 
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is behaviorally stable. We argue that it will be. The voting game being played 
will typically be such that sincere voting is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium 
because of the combination of two facts: insincerity is punished; and the 
incentives for strategic voting are small.  
To see the first, note that the very idea of epistemic solidarity 
presupposes truthful revelation of one’s private signal in the pre-election 
ballot. Given the purpose for which the Masses institute the pre-election 
ballot, a strong norm of sincere, non-strategic voting in the pre-ballot is likely 
to emerge; and those who are seen to deviate from that norm are likely to 
suffer social sanctions, if only reputational damage. Even if votes are secret 
and unobservable, the costs in terms of negative self-image or the costs of 
pretending to have voted sincerely can tip the balance.  To see the second fact, 
note that the chances of any particular vote being decisive among a large 
group are small, and the incentives for strategic voting based on pivotality 
considerations are therefore limited. It is exceedingly unlikely you will be the 
pivotal voter in large populations, which results in a small expected gain 
from strategic voting. By contrast, the threat of sanctions to ensure truth-
telling in the pre-election ballot can be powerful, and is likely to outweigh the 
strategic incentives. Taking these factors into account, it is plausible that 
sincere voting is indeed a Nash equilibrium. 
In the limiting case (where the size of the Masses approaches infinity), 
we can be completely confident that the pre-election ballot among the Masses 
12 
 
will indicate where the true interests of the Masses lie, assuming no (or at 
least not too much) strategic voting occurs in it and the other CJT 
assumptions are met.8  Since the probability that the majority is correct 
increases rapidly with the number of voters for any competence level much 
above ½, this result approximately obtains even among much smaller groups.  
Table 2 displays the probability that the majority vote among groups 
numbering between 40 and 100 members will be correct, for varying levels of 
individual competence.  There we see, for example, that even for a group 
numbering merely 100, if the individual competence of members of that 
group is pm=0.55 the probability that a majority among them is correct is 
0.841. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Suppose now that all members of the Masses practice epistemic 
solidarity, by voting in the election for whatever option won the pre-election 
ballot among their group. Then, as long as the Masses’ pre-election ballot 
succeeds in correctly picking M (which we have just seen is very likely, even 
among relatively modest-sized groups), the Masses’ preferred alternative is 
highly likely to win in the subsequent election. At the limit, with population 
                                                 
8 With the important caveat, of course, that the voters are independent, conditional on the 
state. Neither the convergence to 1 nor the monotonic increase of group competence 
in group size necessarily obtains once the independence condition is weakened. See 
Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013) for a discussion and a theorem in that regard.  
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size going towards infinity while keeping the ratio E:M fixed, the proportion 
of votes for M (the position in the true interest of the Masses) will be [M+(1-
pe)E]/ N and the proportion of votes for E will be peE/ N.  Since, ex hypothesi, 
M>E, the position of the Masses would prevail comfortably. 
Thus, the practice of epistemic solidarity can be a powerful tool in the 
hands of the Masses.  But in one way, it might look like a tool of strictly 
limited utility.  Not only does its use presuppose that both competence and 
independence assumptions hold. Furthermore, it is only within a fairly 
narrow range of values of pm that the tool will at one and the same time both 
work and be needed.  It will work only where pm>0.5 (with competence below 
0.5 the theorem’s optimistic conclusions no longer follow).  And it is needed 
only where the Masses would not win by the force of numbers alone, which 
at the limit is where pm > (E/M)(pe - ½) + ½.  In the example sketched above 
(where pe=0.7 and E/M=0.20) that value would be pm < 0.54.  In that example, 
therefore, the Masses both need and stand to benefit from epistemic solidarity 
only within a relatively narrow range 0.50<pm<0.54.  Still, many real world 
cases may well fall within that window – which is to say, the Masses might 
often be better than random, but not by much.   
Furthermore, it is worth noting the magnitude of the contribution that 
epistemic solidarity can make among smaller populations to the probability 
of a victory for the position in the interests of the Masses.  Table 3 pulls 
together for ease of comparison values from table 1 and 2. It displays in the 
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bottom right corner of each cell the probability of a victory for M (the position 
in the true interest of the Masses) for the case of E=21 and M=100, for various 
values of pm, assuming the Masses practice epistemic solidarity and the Elites 
do not.  For ease of comparison, the probability of a victory for M if neither 
Masses nor Elites practice epistemic solidarity is reproduced as the italicized 
number in the upper left corner of each cell. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
First concentrate on the column of Table 3 where pm=0.51.  For all the 
values reported, practicing epistemic solidarity will probably make literally 
the difference between the Masses winning and losing.  We knew that much 
from Equation 2.  But the thing to notice from Table 3 is how very much of a 
difference it makes to the probabilities, even in this relatively small-group 
setting.  Take once again the case of pm=0.51 and pe=0.7.  Without epistemic 
solidarity the chance of an M victory is only 28%; with it, that likelihood 
jumps to 58%.  Furthermore, practicing epistemic solidarity makes more of a 
difference the larger the individual competence gap between Elites and 
Masses.  Take the case of pm=0.51 and pe=0.8. Without epistemic solidarity M 
has almost no chance of winning (the likelihood of that is only 16%), whereas 
with the Masses practicing epistemic solidarity that likelihood jumps to 58% 
again. 
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Next take a case where epistemic solidarity is not strictly needed, in the 
sense that the position most in the interest of the Masses is likely to win 
anyway.  Consider for example the cell in Table 3 where pm=0.55 and pe=0.70. 
Even if the Masses do not practice epistemic solidarity, M is 56% likely to win.  
But if they do, that likelihood jumps to 84%.  Politically, that is a huge 
difference – the difference between a close-run thing and a virtual certainty.  
So even in these sorts of cases, the Masses can benefit greatly from practicing 
epistemic solidarity, even in relatively small-group settings. 
 
 
 B.  Elites Against Masses 
 
Of course, either side or both could avail themselves of the strategy of 
epistemic solidarity.  Conventionally, solidarity is most often discussed as a 
weapon of the weak, not least because they are in most need of it to overcome 
the strong.  But solidarity may actually be practiced more easily among the 
strong, who are better networked and who thus find it easier to exchange 
information and coordinate their actions to ensure their interests are served.  
For these practical reasons, epistemic solidarity (as opposed to other forms of 
solidarity, perhaps) may turn out to be a weapon more available to the Elites. 
Suppose both the Elites and the Masses practice epistemic solidarity 
within their own groups.  Then the law of large numbers tells us that in the 
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limiting case (as both E and M approach infinity, keeping their ratio constant) 
the proportion of votes for each position would simply equal the proportion 
of members of each group.  With a proportion of approximately M/N votes 
for M and E/N  votes for E, and M>E, the Mass position would ordinarily be 
the clear winner.  That follows straightforwardly, and is relatively 
uninteresting. 
More interesting is the case in which the Elites practice epistemic 
solidarity while the Masses do not. That compounds the epistemic advantage 
that the more competent Elites already have over the Masses.  Among large 
populations (with fixed proportion E:M), vote proportions would be 
approximately (E+[1- pm]M)/N  for E and pmM/N for M.  Thus, the Elites 
practicing epistemic solidarity increases the number of votes for E and 
reduces the number for M, compared to the case where neither group 
practices epistemic solidarity. At the limit, the Elites win if  
 
pm <  E/2M + ½        Eq. 3 
 
For example, suppose, as before, M is five times larger than E, and suppose 
the Elites practice solidarity and the Masses do not.  Then at the limit the 
option that is in the interests of the Elites, E, will prevail whenever pm < 0.6. 
Table 4 provides a few examples for smaller populations with the same 
group size and competence parameters as in Table 1.  As we see from Table 4, 
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even moderately small Elite groups practicing epistemic solidarity can 
seriously reduce the probability of a win for the option that is in the Masses’ 
interests.  Take the case discussed above, in which the Elite has size E=21 and 
individual competence pe=0.7 and the Mass has size M=100 and individual 
competence pm=0.55.  From Table 4 we see that, if Elites practice epistemic 
solidarity while the Masses do not, the probability of M (the position in the 
true interest of the Masses) winning is only 16%.  That compares to 56% 
probability of M winning when neither Elites nor Masses were practicing 
epistemic solidarity, as reported in Table 1.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
But even if the Elites practice epistemic solidarity and the Masses do 
not, that does not always lead to an Elite victory.  Look what happens, for 
example, if the Elites are much smaller relative to the Masses.  Consider the 
case of E=11 and M=100, with the same levels of individual competence as 
before.  Then there would be a 51% chance of M (the position in the true 
interest of the Masses) winning, despite the Elites practicing epistemic 
solidarity and the Masses not. 
 
 
 
18 
 
III.  Interim Conclusions 
 
Despite being substantially more numerous than the Elites, the Masses might 
nonetheless lose to them because individual members the Masses are 
substantially less competent at judging their true interests.  But as we have 
shown, the Masses can often rectify that by practicing epistemic solidarity, 
pooling their information about their interests with one another.  If they do so 
they will typically prevail over the Elites, whether or not the Elites do the 
same.  But if the Elites practice epistemic solidarity while the Masses do not, 
the Elites can sometimes in that way beat the Masses.   
Let us summarize these results with the aid of a numerical example.  
Imagine a society composed of an Elite numbering 200,000 and 1 million 
members of the Masses.  Suppose that the competence of individual members 
of the Elite in judging their own true interests is pe=0.7 while that of 
individual members of the Masses is pm=0.51.  The approximate number of 
votes that can be statistically expected for each option from each type of voter 
is as shown in Figure 1 as the gray and white proportion of the bars. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In that Figure 1 example, the Masses lose narrowly if neither they nor 
the Elites practice epistemic solidarity, and the Masses lose by an even wider 
margin if the Elites practice solidarity and the Masses do not. The figure also 
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shows why: if the Masses do not pool their information, 49% of them (the 
hatched white bar section) mistakenly support E instead of M.   But just so 
long as the Masses themselves practice epistemic solidarity, the Masses 
prevail.  And that remains almost as powerfully true whether or not the Elites 
practice epistemic solidarity as well. 
 
IV.  Sensitivity to Uncertainty Concerning Who Belongs in the Group 
 
As we have seen, people who have the same interests but are individually not 
terribly competent in identifying what serves their interest (like the Masses) 
can find out with great reliability what is in their interest if they take a 
majority vote among themselves. In that way, the Masses can usually succeed 
in outvoting the Elites.  However, in order to do that, they first have to 
identify ‘who is with them’.  
That may well be a challenge for the Masses in particular.  If they are 
individually not very good at identifying what is in their interest, they may 
also find it difficult to know with whom they share the same interests. The 
Elites, by contrast, may have a few aces up their sleeves:  in addition to being 
more competent individually, they might be able to devote more efforts to 
finding out who is ‘with them’, they tend to ‘know people who know’, they 
are probably socially more mobile and better networked, and they often 
dominate the public discourse. All this helps the Elites to identify their own 
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and to vote for their interests as a block. As we have seen, if the Masses 
remain divided while the Elites coordinate their votes, the Elites will often be 
able to impose their minority interests on the community as a whole. 
So far we have been assuming that people have perfect information 
about who is in the group that shares the same interests as they do.  If so, then 
the group with which they practice epistemic solidarity will contain all and 
only those with whom they share an interest.  In the real world, however, 
there is bound to be some uncertainty surrounding who shares the same 
interests with them.  Just how sensitive might our findings be to those 
uncertainties? 
 
A. Incomplete Assortation:  Some Abstain from Epistemic Solidarity 
 
Basically, there are two different ways an agent might respond to uncertainty 
over which group shares his interests.  Someone who is subjectively 
particularly uncertain and averse to the risk of joining the wrong group might 
prefer to abstain from practicing epistemic solidarity with either group. 
Abstaining means not joining a group, not taking part in a pre-ballot and 
voting purely on the basis of one’s own individual judgment of where one’s 
own interests lie.9    
                                                 
9 Another theoretical possibility is to join a group and take part in their pre-ballot, but then 
vote according to one’s private signal. Note, however, that we assumed that once 
one has joined a pooling group voting in line with the pre-ballot is institutionally 
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If some individuals abstain from epistemic pooling, this would simply 
create a situation in between that represented by the values in the two corners 
of each cell in Table 3.  The top left value in each cell there represents the 
probability of an M victory if none of the Mass voters practiced epistemic 
solidarity; the bottom right value represents the probability of an M victory if 
all the Mass voters practiced epistemic solidarity.  If, for instance, only half of 
the Mass voters practiced epistemic solidarity, the probability of an M victory 
would be in between those two values (tilted towards the higher value, as the 
marginal returns of pooling are decreasing in group size).  In the case that 
served as our previous running example of M=100, E=21, pe=0.7 and pm=0.55, 
the probability of an M victory if only half the Masses practice epistemic 
solidarity is 0.76. Thus, it is not always necessary for all of the Masses to pool 
their information to win.  
For very large populations, the outcome at the limit can be calculated in 
the same manner as before. Suppose a fixed proportion of φM of the M 
members of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity (with 1>φM >0) and the 
rest of the Masses vote on the basis of their own individual judgment.  As 
before, we assume that pm>0.5, so that each Mass voter has the same better-
than-random probability of individually correctly assessing where his true 
                                                                                                                                           
required. Influencing the pre-ballot without following it is therefore not possible. 
This is a plausible restriction, as pooling groups would be likely to have strong 
norms (which people joining the group themselves internalize) against members 
who enter their vote in the pre-ballot without following it. We have invoked 
precisely such a norm in our argument against strategic voting above. 
22 
 
interests lie.  Similarly, each member of the Elites has competence pe>0.5 of 
individually correctly assessing where her true Elite interests lie, and suppose 
none of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity.  Then at the limit, as 
population size goes to infinity while keeping the ratio E:M fixed, the pre-
election ballot will direct a share of approximately φMM/N voters toward M; 
and M will garner approximately another pm(1 – φM)M/N proportion of the 
votes from members of the Masses not practicing epistemic solidarity and 
approximately a E(1 - pe)/N proportion of votes from members of the Elites 
mistakenly voting against their own true interests. E will garner 
approximately a peE/N share of votes from members of the Elites voting 
correctly in their true interests and approximately another (1-pm)(1 – φM)M /N 
share of votes from members of the Masses who do not practice epistemic 
solidarity, voting mistakenly against their own true interests.   Thus, at the 
limit, M will defeat E if 
φMM + pm(1 – φM)M + E(1 - pe) > peE + (1 - pm)(1 – φM)M ,  Eq. 3 
 
which can be rearranged to 
 
φM > [(E/M)(pe - ½ ) - (pm – ½ )]/[(1 - pm)].    Eq. 4 
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Thus, for example, if  pm=0.51 and pe =0.7 and E and M are both large with 
E:M=1:5,  then M is expected to win so long as a little over 6% of the Masses 
practice epistemic solidarity and none of the Elites do. 
Next suppose that both the Elites and the Masses practice epistemic 
solidarity, but some of each abstain from that practice on grounds they are 
subjectively too uncertain which is their own true group.  Suppose once again 
that φMM out of the total M true members of the Masses practice epistemic 
solidarity; and now add to that the assumption that φEE  out of the total E true 
members of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity (with 1>φE >0).  Those not 
practicing epistemic solidarity vote on the basis of their individual perception 
of where their true interests lie, with accuracy of pm and pe for members of the 
Masses and Elites, as before.   
By reasoning analogous to that underlying Equation 3, at the limit M is 
expected to beat E if 
 
φMM + pm(1 - φM)M + (1 - pe)(1 – φE)E  
> φEE + pe(1 – φE)E + (1 - pm)(1 - φM)M,      Eq. 5 
which can be rearranged to 
 φM > [(E/M)( φE + pe - peφE - ½) - ( pm – ½)] / (1 - pm).  Eq. 6 
 
That means that, in a similar scenario to the one just considered (pm=0.51, pe 
=0.7, E:M=1:5) then if just half of the true members of the Elites practice 
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epistemic solidarity, M  is expected to win so long as more than about 12.2% 
of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity.  Even if 80% of the Elites practice 
epistemic solidarity, only more than about 15.9% of the Masses need to do so 
in order to make an M victory more likely than not. 
Inequalities 4 and 6 come in handy if we want to explore how sensitive 
our conclusions are to abstentions from epistemic solidarity.  In our running 
example, as long as a non-negligible proportion of the Masses practice 
epistemic solidarity, the option in the Masses’ true interests will win, and that 
is true within broad limits no matter how many of the Elites practice 
epistemic solidarity. This also becomes clear by looking at the large grey 
hatched bar when the Masses pool in Figure 1: their pooled votes carry the 
Masses comfortably over the majority threshold, so that there is a lot of room 
for less pooling discipline without a change in outcome. However, different 
parameter values might put the result much more on a knife’s edge, so that 
near universal pooling would be required. 
 
B. Imperfect Assortation  
 
A second possible response, tempting to those who are subjectively uncertain 
but perhaps not quite so uncertain or not quite so risk averse, is to practice 
epistemic solidarity with the group that they think is most likely to share 
their own interests – knowing that there is a risk they will get that assessment 
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wrong, and end up practicing epistemic solidarity with the ‘wrong’ group, 
from their own point of view. 
 The groups in which pooling takes place would then no longer be 
homogeneous, as they were (by stipulation) in the models discussed 
previously.  
For the purpose of this model, assume that everyone knows that there 
are exactly two types of people in the population.  One is the Mass type, the 
other is the Elite type, and just as before there are M of the former and E of 
the latter.  Let us further assume that all Elite type individuals have the same 
probability pge > 0.5 of correctly identifying which type they are, while all 
Mass type individuals have probability pgm. Call this the ‘group selection 
competence’ of the Mass and Elite type, respectively.  Let the population then 
be exhaustively partitioned into two groups, one composed of self-assessed 
members of the Masses and the other self-assessed members of the Elites. 
Note that the sizes and compositions of these groups can vary, as they are the 
result of a stochastic assortation process.  
Logically, there could be strategic considerations standing against the 
truthful revelation of one’s perception of one’s group type.10  But here we rule 
                                                 
10 A notable Nash equilibrium has all individuals end up in the same group with a pooling 
pre-ballot. Any unilateral deviation is unattractive, as the large pooling group 
always wins against one voter in the other group, while being in the large groups 
provides a non-zero probability of being pivotal. In fact, if the larger group is a 
pooling group, being in the smaller group is dominated by being in the larger, 
winning group. This may be of some real-world interest: if individuals expect that 
one group will be larger and a pooling group, then this group is preferred if the 
individuals only care about getting their preferred result. 
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out strategic considerations, in terms of group choice as well as pre-ballot 
voting. This is not purely for convenience of modeling.  There may be good 
sociological reasons for people to reveal truthfully their perception of to 
which group they belong. They may have an expressive desire to join ‘their 
own group’ or, as before, a normative commitment to positively contribute to 
epistemic pooling within their own true group. In addition, joining the ‘right’ 
group may have positive side-payments that outweigh any strategic 
considerations. 
Finally, suppose that all Mass (respectively: Elite) type individuals have 
probability pm>0.5 (pe>0.5) of being correct in their personal assessment of 
their own interests in the case at hand, as before. In the first instance, we can 
explore this setup with computer simulations, investigating how the group 
selection competence influences the epistemic success of the Elites and 
Masses. 
In Figure 2, we plot the proportions of Mass majorities (relying on 1000 
simulations for each data point) as a function of group selection competence, 
which for now we assume to be equal for both types, such that pgm = pge. The 
number of Elite types is 21 and of Mass types 100. The former have 
competence pe = 0.7 and the latter pm = 0.55. The circle markers show the 
probability of a Mass majority when only the self-assessed Elite group pools, 
the diamonds when only the self-assessed Mass group pools, and the stars 
when both groups pool.  
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 [Figure 2 about here] 
 
We know from Table 4 that if the Elites and the Masses self-identify 
completely correctly and the Elites alone pool their votes, the probability of a 
Mass victory is 16%. This result is reflected in Figure 2 by the right-most circle 
marker: when group selection competence is 1, Mass majorities have a 
probability of about 16%. It is, prima facie, unsurprising that the Elites benefit 
from higher group selection competence when they are the only group 
pooling. By contrast, when the Masses or both groups pool votes, then the 
larger size of the self-assessed Mass group turns a higher group selection 
competence into an advantage for the Masses – the more homogeneous the 
pooling groups become, the more epistemically successful the Masses become 
in their pooling, outvoting the small Elite group quite reliably. 
This looks like a straightforward story. But consider Figure 3, which is 
the same as Figure 1 except with competence parameters altered to pe=0.8 and 
pm=0.6.  There, an interesting twist to that story stands out better.  Focus on 
the curve of circle markers (that is, pooling of the self-assessed Elites only). 
The probability of a Mass majority is at its lowest at a group selection 
competence of about 85%. That suggests that, when only the self-assessed 
Elites pool their votes, the Elites benefits most from individuals making 
occasional mistakes when choosing their group.  
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The reason lies in the variable sizes of the self-assessed groups. Were 
group selection competence set to 1, all Elite types would end up in the Elite 
group and all Mass types in the Mass group, leading to group sizes E and M. 
However, if group selection competence is below 1 (but above 0.5) and E<M, 
we would expect the self-assessed Elite group to be larger than E and the self-
assessed Mass group to be smaller than M because there will be more Masses 
who mistakenly choose the Elite group than there are Elites who mistakenly 
choose the Mass group. This increase in the size of the Elite group benefits the 
pooling Elites because (as long as the proportion of truly Mass agents in the 
self-assessed Elite group is small enough to be outvoted reliably by the true 
Elites) the Elite group in this way ‘captures’ some unsuspecting Mass voters 
and, by pooling, leads them to vote for the Elite interests.11 
So far we have been assuming group selection competence is identical 
for everyone in the population.  Next let us see what happens if we hold that 
constant for the Masses, at pgm=0.6, while letting the group selection of the 
                                                 
11 If we were allowing strategic behavior (which here we are assuming away), that would 
suggest a strategy for the Masses:  if a great many of them could strategically 
coordinate to pose as members of the Elite and vote in the Elite’s pre-election ballot 
in line with their own true interest M in sufficient numbers for that to win the Elite’s 
pre-election ballot, they could in that way hijack the Elite’s epistemic pooling in the 
service of their own true Mass interests.  Of course as soon as the Elite realized this 
was happening the rules of their epistemic pooling would probably change, so that 
e.g. members of the pooling group cannot simply self-nominate as members but 
instead would have to be accepted by sufficiently many other members. 
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Elites pge vary.  The results of that are displayed in Figure 4, for the case once 
again of M=100 E=21, pe=0.7 and pm=0.55. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Two things change between Figures 3 and 4.  First, the rise at the end of 
the row of circle markers (where only the Elites pool) disappears.  That is just 
as we would expect, given our explanation for the rise that was observed in 
Figure 3. That, we argued, resulted from fewer Mass agents mistakenly 
identifying themselves as Elite as the group identification competence of the 
Masses (as well as of the Elites) increases in Figure 3. But in Figure 4, pgm is 
held constant at 0.6, so roughly the same proportion of Mass agents will 
mistakenly join the Elite group across all cases shown in Figure 3.    
Second and more interesting is what happens in the row of star markers 
(where both Elites and Masses pool).  If the Elites are more competent at 
recognizing their true type, then even where both Elites and Masses practice 
epistemic solidarity the Elites benefit more from that practice.   
Indeed, very high group selection competence among the Elites might 
even lead to an Elite victory, despite the fact that Elites and Masses are both 
pooling. With the parameters set as in Figure 4, for example, the row of star 
markers gets close to the 0.5 threshold for values of pge around 0.95.  That is, 
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however, obviously a very extreme case, involving the unrealistically high 
value of pge~0.95. 
The upshot of our analysis in this section is that our interim conclusions 
stand up well and can be robust to the introduction of uncertainty regarding 
group choice.  There are basically two types of responses to such uncertainty.  
One is to abstain from practicing epistemic solidarity at all.  The other is to 
take one’s chances, practicing epistemic solidarity with whichever group 
seems most likely to be truly your own but knowing you might be wrong 
about that.  Our analysis suggest that, depending on the parameters, a very 
substantial proportion of the Masses can abstain in the first way, or be more 
likely to get it wrong in the second way than the Elites, and our overall 
conclusion still stands up. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Solidarity is often taken as a matter of concerted action: pooling resources or 
coordinating behavior. The Masses improve their chances of overcoming the 
smaller but more powerful Elites if they display solidarity in that sense. We 
have shown that solidarity can also be about pooling in quite a different 
sense: the joint formation of correct beliefs. The Masses may be uncertain 
about what is truly in their interest, and if they succeed in pooling the 
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dispersed pieces of information they hold they can overcome this ‘false 
consciousness’.  This strategy can work well, but it faces an obvious problem: 
to successfully identify the Mass interest by information pooling, the Masses 
need to know who they have a shared interest with. If they fail to identify 
their own, while the Elites succeed, the well-organized Elites may gain the 
upper hand, even though they are much smaller in numbers. Our results give 
a new twist to the old adage that ‘knowledge is power’ – one needs to know 
one’s own interest, but to acquire that knowledge, one needs to know who 
knows. 
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Table 1: Probabilities of a majority for the alternative in the interests of the 
Masses for different Elite and Mass competence and group sizes. Values with 
asterisk are those for which inequality (2) is true.  
 
 
 
 40 60 80 100 
pm = 0.51 0.550 0.561 0.571 0.579 
pm = 0.55 0.736 0.780 0.814 0.841 
pm = 0.6 0.898 0.940 0.964 0.978 
 
Table 2: Probabilities of majorities for the alternative in the interests of the 
Masses in the pre-election ballot among the Masses, according to the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem (assuming that ties are broken by a coin toss). 
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 pm = 0.51 pm = 0.55 pm = 0.6 
pe = 0.6 
0.42 
0.58 
0.70 
0.84 
0.93 
0.98 
pe = 0.7 
0.28 
0.58 
0.56 
0.84 
0.86 
0.98 
pe = 0.8 
0.16 
0.58 
0.40 
     0.84 
0.76 
0.98 
    
 
Table 3: Probabilities of a majorities for the alternative in the interests of the 
Masses in election assuming all Mass voters vote strictly in accordance with 
pre-election ballot among the Masses, assuming E=21 and M=100. 
(Probability without pre-election ballot in top left of cell it italics, probability 
following pre-election ballot in bottom right of cell.) 
 
 
Table 4: Probabilities of a majority for the alternative in the interests of the 
Masses for different Elite and Mass competence and group sizes, with Elites 
pooling their votes (based on 10,000 vote simulations each). 
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Figure 1: Approximate expected vote distribution, E=200,000, M=1,000,000; 
pe=0.7, pm=0.51.
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Figure 2: Probability of Mass majorities as a function of group selection 
competence. 
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Figure 3: Probability of Mass majorities as a function of group selection 
competence. 
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Figure 4: Probability of Mass majorities as a function of the Elite group 
selection competence, Mass group selection competence fixed. 
 
 
 
 
